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n eve e. am pleased to have the opportunity to sh
*th you some of my reflections about my trip to China with President Clinton. I also want to
Ik about why I think it is important that we continue on a road toward strengthening our
rate ic relationship ith China
Before I begin, I would just like to take a moment to thank my4 imfriend, Bob
Kapp, who has done a masterful job as president of U.S.-China Business Coun. Your work
has made a real difference in improving Sino-American relations.de
Let me also recognize the Council's I -ti xecutive director, Richard Brecher. A
you all know, Richard has recently moved on t ne things. ut let me say that his work on
MFN status and trade with China has been irreplace e ever since the MFN debate began. He
deserves our thnk an fplue
Stonic at hanA I- ~ 9 -o7- /I *
President Clinton's visit tgdina was the first presidential missio smce 1989. An event
dike this offers us a chance to ask ourselves the basic question: What do we want o relationship
with C a t j {
ur goal should be to encourage China to adopt the standards that most of the world
And these include human rights and the rule of law at home; reciprocal open markets;
rictions on weapons sales; and cooperation on the crucial security issues. Adopting these
values are in China's best interest, as well as our own.
Easier said than done.
Some fundamental issues remain unresolved. China still, I believe, hopes to enter the
world economy without fully opening itself. While I believe most Chinese are enthusiastic about
er re tionship, I still think the country has not budged on many the of the critical issues.
ainl he American public and Congress is not confident about China's long-term
intentions.
But that said, the trends in most major issues are in the right direction. And our task,
then, is to encourage them. And engagement with China, including events like the Presidential
visit, is a means to that end.
Critics have asked whether the trip was worth it. I would reply with a resounding yes. Let
me tell you why.
,
This trip succeeded because it built confidence at the highest levels of government.
Confidence that will allow us to manage our problems before they erupt into crisis. And this trip -
is helping us work out complicated issues, such as China's efforts in the trade arena.
Before the trip, I stated my belief that engagement with China was a means to an end. I
think now - more than ever - China needs the United States to help bring it into the 21
Century. That's my observation from this trip and previous trips to China.
OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS
This trip proved that if we engage China, as the president and delegation did, we can
speak directly to the Chinese people about the importance of creating strategic partnerships and vt
atagit-American values. /
By going to China, the president delivered our message - a message of democracy,
freedom, human rights, free markets -- to hundreds of millions of Chinese people. That was
historic. It was a powerful symbol that demonstrated very publicly our expectations for reform
in China.
As the leader of the congressional delegation, I had the chance to meet with Chinese
officials and experts who shared their candid views about the state of our relationship. From the
Chinese military officers at the National Defense University to the students at Fudan University
in Shanghai, the theme of this trip could best be summarized as "knowledge is power." And so
we and the Chinese must continue to gain knowledge from each other, to develop a mutually
beneficial dialogue about each other and about our still-fledgling relationship
CHINA TRADE AS AN ECONOMIC ISSUE
What did I personally learn on this trip? Trade continues to be a big problem. Huge.
Getting worse.
To date, our goal has been to open trade through a successful WTO accession, which r
would further open t e Chinese market to our goods and services.
At the sam it would allow us to move forward on full normalization of trade relations,
including permanent Normal Trade Relations status (formerly called Most Favored Nation
trading status).
That is the right goal. But negotiations have stalled. In fact, we have lost ground in
terms of our market access. During my visit, I pressed the issue of trade at every level - from
President Jiang, to Premier Zhu, to th of Trade and Agriculture. I id this with the
firm belief that we can't afford to let China turn inward again. That we have to push to open
China's markets. And push to eventually get them into the WTO.
This much I can tell you: the status quo will not stand.
In talks with university economists, private consultants and businesspeople working in
China, it's clear to me that Chinese officials are protecting their economy from the Asian
economic flu. The Chinese worry about their economy as they lay off workers at State-Owned
Enterprises.
At the same time, their tradition of maintaining a self-contained economy - producing
everything they need - looms large as we try to pry open their markets.
Thus, they are backsliding in their ag sector, continuing to subsidize production and barring
rivate firms from the distribution network.
The bureaucratic inertia on WTO accession and opening markets was frustrating to
the congressional delegation and American officials on the trip. It's clear we're far from our go1
of getting them to move. And as U.S. Trade Representative Barshefsky said to the Americ
Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, WTO accession won't be on political terms. It will be on
economic terms - when China makes progress on transparency, high tariffs, ag barriers, halts
piracy, and simplifies its bureaucracy.
Without significant movement on these issues in the future, the good feelings between
our two countries will dissipate and our relationship will crumble.
That said, we must capitalize on the momentum created by the trip to JLprovyeour-trade
relationship. The Chinese got a lot out of this trip. Now they need to reciprocate.
What can we do to get China to move toward WTO accession.
We need to be respectful -- and tough. Tougher than we have been in the past.
Most of the reforms we hope to see in the near future include: lower tariffs and quotas,
with a particular emphasis on the rule of law; fewer subsidies; and a mor arket-
driven economy. But how do we achieve these modest goals? There are ee levers.
N
First, China must have a material incentive to enter the WTO. I still believe that the
Administration should endorse, and Congress pass, a law to make permanent Normal Trading
Relations status automatic when China enters the WTO.
But is China ready to enter the World Trade Organization this year, next year or in the /
next decade? They're not acting like it. China's ministries seem to be thinking over WTO
U t
I
accession at leisure, with no penalties for delay.
Those of us who support engagement with China are finding ourselves increasingly
frustrated with a country whose Great Wall is more than just a world wonder. It is a brick wall
we keep running into. I told them in no uncertain terms that they need to lower their barriers, or
there will be repercussions.
Some have argued we should lower the bar for China to enter the WTO. That's a bad
idea. If we allow them to enter on lesser terms now, when they are backsliding, we would be , 2
offering them incentive to wait longer. China's accession must reflect real reform.
The second lever: China must have a . ter the WTO. So with our
bilateral talks on Taiwan's membership complete, the Administration should push for Taiwan's
rapid entry into the WTO, regardless of where talks with China stand.
We know from history and our recent trip to China that officials there are very sensitive
about Taiwan, and our relationship with that country. We know that China has opposed Taiwan
becoming a member of the WTO before it does.
But, as you know, Taiwan has willingly worked toward WTO accession, and made all the
necessary concessions to become a full-fledged member. They want to play ball. We can get
China's attention if we press for Taiwan's immediate WTO accession -- demonstrating that
China's delay has a cost.
And the third lever we have to initiate reform: China must see a price for unnecessary
delay in entering WTO. So we should keep the option of opening a broad market access case
under Section 301 of our trade law nearby. And, we need to let China know that we are serious
about invoking Section 301 if they don't move forward on market access.
The good feelings engendered by this trip can continue. But China must go beyond a
fundamental basic interest of avoiding conflict and become a responsible international player that
can a dress issues that further promote peace and prosperity. There is much room for
mprovement.
CHINA AS A POLITICAL ISSUE
Our relationship with China is also political.
Certainly those of us in the U.S. Senate who have been long-time advocates of Normal
Trade Relations (or MFN) with China are getting fed up. The lack of progress in market access,
distribution and our alarming trade deficit have done nothing to deter our critics.
Moreover, with congressional division over trade and our China policy, future
engagement with China -- including WTO accession -- may become a divisive issue in the 2000
presidential campaign. The consequences of that are hard to predict. But ever since the 1950s
and the "who lost China" debate, when China policy has become a political issue, the
consequences of politicizing the China issue have generally been bad.
That doesn't mean we should stifle debate on our China policy. Just that we do it in a
productive fashion and not get swamped in partisan bickering and political one-ups-man-ship.
That we do what's right to secure American interests.
Few foreign relationships affect the American people as much as this one. It's important
that we get it right.
CONCLUSION
Finally, we -- in Congress and the American public -- need to reach an agreement on how
we treat our China policy. That essentially means when we reach a basic consensus on such a
policy that we do not then play political games with it.
I believe that Congress must work on a bipartisan basis to develop a comprehensive,
rational and insightful China policy as we wrap up this Congress and entrter-the-l 1 -Senator
Hagel and I are co-chairing an ad hoc group of senators who think that America needs a
bipartisan foreign policy. One that is constructive rather than destructive. One that has America's
best interests at heart, rather than politics at its root.
Our bottom line is the same as former Secretary of State James Baker's: Let's do what's
best for America. Let's work together - Congress and the executive branch. Democrats and
Republicans.
For the American public, I would offer the challenge of taking a more active stand in
encouraging Chinese reform. Those of you here today have set a fine example of finding a niche
in a neophyte marketplace. However, I would ask you today to think out of the box. That is to
say: ask yourself how your enterprise can contribute to China's internal development?
Can you clean up the environment by investing in clean technologies? Can you promote
human rights by setting higher standards in labor practices? Can you enlighten by education?
Lead by example?
And if you do that, what do you get in return? A healthy China that is ready for accession
to the World Trade Organization on a mutually acceptable basis and a market that is ready,
willing and able to do business.
Together, as we engage China, we must keep American values and interests in mind.
We need to show the Chinese that we want to be strategic partners on security issues. We must
expect that they will improve their environment and human rights records. And, we must
demonstrate over and over again that we are serious -- firm and tough -- about gaining access to
their markets.
Through this historic trip, we advanced America's interests. We didn't get all we wanted.
For a country that has more millennia under its belt than we have centuries under ours, progress
is bound to be slow.
But we have significantly improved our relationship with the world's most populous
nation. And engaged them in a constructive dialogue that I hope will bode well for America,
China and the world.
Thank you.
Now I will take questions.
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Subject: Some CELI thoughts as promised last week...
Message Contents
Hope the markup went well this morning. With reference to our conversation last
Friday, I think some interesting points for discussion at the CELI China
luncheon might include --
I. Premises of US China policy
-- Most participants in debates on U.S. China policy have generally shared
the premise that China will continue growing rapidly for years to come. Some
have accented the possibility that this process under Communist party rule could
create a strong and aggressive China threatening US interests in the region.
-- Others (like me) have felt that this would over time in foreign affairs
bring China to see more of a stake in peaceful relations with its neighbors, and
domestically create pressure for China to adopt the rule of law and a more open
society.
II. Current situation
-- There is a long way to go before we see the truth. So far, the more
optimistic assumptions have been borne out.
-- Thirty years ago, China was openly dedicated to overthrowing the
governments of neighboring countries; today it is trying to help them weather
the Asian financial crisis. And where it once fought us in Korea, today it is
working with us.
-- At home, China is adopting laws and judicial procedures on many topics --
commercial law, customs procedures, environmental protection -- from Hong Kong
and the US, including allowing citizens to sue government agencies. The Chinese
press is continuously becoming more free to report on social problems,
corruption etc, and in the last year academics have conducted a fairly open
debate on political reform.
-- However, thus far Chinese growth has not led to the commercial
opportunities businesses have predicted. China remains relatively closed to
imports, and US exports to China in particular have grown in absolute terms more
slowly than to any regions except the former Soviet Union and Africa. In terms
of trade policy, the IPR agreements have been a pretty remarkable success, but
we have a long way to go on the market access issues. Further, the WTO is
advancing with or without China -- it will soon take up agriculture, services
and other negotiations and if China is not in before they conclude, the talks
will be even more complicated.
You might ask the business community reps there for their views on whether we
push China harder, offer more incentives, etc.
*III.. Are premises correct?
-- We should, however, be willing to question our premises. The last year's
events have shown that economic growth in rapidly developing countries can come
to an end very quickly. China has some strong points -- $140 billion in foreign
reserves plus $90 billion in Hong Kong reserves -- but also some weaknesses,
including large buildup of bad loans, endemic corruption and nepotism, and
property bubbles of the sort familiar in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's economy
grew by 7-8% as recently as 1996 and is now set to contract by 10-15%. Is China
vulnerable -to-the-same-sudden slump? If-so, is its political system-capable of
dealing with it as the Thais and Koreans have?
-- The potential problems created by economic weakness in China -- political
upheavals in a country with ICBMs, possible nationalistic abuse of public
sentiment on the status of Taiwan, etc., should be thought through as well as
the potential problems of a strong and aggressive Ghina.
-- In any case, the most important task is to renew MFN status (now
officially I think Normal Trade Relations). That is a signal of stability not
only for China but for the Asian economies generally. And it is the only basis
on which we can negotiate market access.
6~e#
4/6/cC I I~~I -W/t4 Cly t~e QcxO
6k- ~-
C C(CA Y WC--iJ
A(
j (A C
1406
'L7(L C
?,a G& 4 c__e.
c- -r- qtt, /<,C 4
(.
A c tv
/// t -dCJ
72
JK-P
d 7c~e-
I-e
- AG (
//aq J- C,"C- C 6-
L r (("
F
VOIL
